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REDRESS BY A LICENSING
AUTHORITY: SETTLING HOME
IMPROVEMENT DISPUTES IN NEW
YORK CITY
RICHARD A. DAYNARD*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROCESS
The difficulties faced by consumers who are unable to obtain satisfaction
from sellers are well known.' Many consumers never see attorneys', and ab-
sent attorneys' fee statutes,3 full-scale litigation is too expensive to be practica-
ble.4 Small claims courts are limited in both the amount5 and the type6 of
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University; A.B., 1964, Columbia Univer-
sity; J.D., 1967, Harvard University; M.A., 1970, Columbia University; Ph.D., 1980,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
I. See No ACCESS TO LAW: ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL SYS-
TEM (L. Nader ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as No ACCESS TO LAW]. A useful bibliog-
raphy appears at p. 102-10.
2. See generally E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM (1974); H. STUMPF, COM-
MUNITY POLITICS AND LEGAL SERVICES (1975)(these books give general information
on the percentage of the populations represented by legal services);see also Rhode, A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 700 (1981) which
states:
The Legal Services Corporation projected that persons below the official pov-
erty line would encounter between six and one-hundred and thirty two million
legal problems in 1980, while corporation funded offices could handle at most
two million matters. At best, 33% of all the poor's legal needs were addressed,
at worst only 1.51%.
See also Brakel, Judicare in West Virginia, 65 A.B.A. J. 1346 (1979). The report
states, that the plan handled (opened) more than 9,840 cases in 1976-77 and closed
12,000 cases in 1977-78. Therefore, for the 400,000 elgible persons (below the poverty
level), Judicare handled one case per 35-45 eligible persons (one per nine to eleven
families). Total program costs were $1,333,672 in 1977-78 (9840 cases closed multi-
plied by the $135 average cost per case).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 (1976) (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1984). See also J. SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS
AND PRACTICES 26 (1982) (a survey of state statutes).
4. See Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (1969); Trubek, et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 73, 85 (1985).
5. J. RUHNKA & S. WELLER, SMALL CLAIMS COURTS: A NATIONAL EXAMINA-
TION (1978).
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relief provided, and they have an unenviable record of producing unsatisfied
judgments. Other informal techniques are available only sporadically, and
generally require the acquiescence of the seller to accomplish anything at all.'
This article describes the results of a study of an alternative dispute settlement
procedure within the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs which
avoids some of these problems.
Home improvement contractors doing business in New York City are re-
quired to be licensed by the City's Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA).'
A two-year license (or renewal) can be obtained by anyone "over 18 years of
age and of good character",' who has no small claims court judgments out-
standing against him, 10 fills out a few papers and pays the City $100.
Consumers may complain to DCA about a home improvement contractor,
either by letter or in person at DCA offices in Manhattan, Queens, Brooklyn,
or Staten Island. After the complaint is docketed and a file opened, DCA's
Home Improvement Division determines if the contractor is licensed.
If the contractor is unlicensed he is informed by letter of the consumer's
complaint and of his obligation to obtain a license." If the contractor chooses
to ignore this letter, DCA makes no further effort to resolve the dispute. If the
contractor is licensed, he is notified by the Home Improvement Division of the
complaint and urged to resolve it within ten days. If this does not produce a
satisfied consumer, and if the complaint alleges a failure to complete the con-
6. Id.
7. See No ACCESS TO LAW, supra note 1, at 73-74 and sources cited therein.
8. The description of DCA and its procedures is accurate as of 1979, when the
data for this study was collected. Since the purpose of this study is to describe a partic-
ular dispute settlement mechanism and to analyze and evaluate the results it produces,
I have not attempted to update this description.
9. N.Y. CITY DEPT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS ADMIN. CODE, HOME IMPROVE-
MENT BUSINESS ch. 32, art. 42 § B32-355.0(5) (1968) [herinafter DCA HOME IM-
PROVEMENT BUSINESS LAW].
10. Department of Consumer Affairs, General Regulation 7 reprinted in The
City Record, Vol, CV, No. 31504, p. 2121 (June 30, 1977) [herinafter DCA Gen. Reg.
7].
1I. N.Y. CITY DEPT. OF CONSUMER AFFIARS, LICENSE ENFORCEMENT LAW, Ti-
tle A § 773-5.0 (1973) [herinafter DCA LICENSE ENFORCEMENT ACT] subjects unli-
censed businesses to fines of between $25 and $2000, and their owners to imprisonment
for up to 60 days plus civil penalties. Additionally, DCA HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSI-
NESS LAW § B32-365.0, provides even stiffer penalties, making the unlicensed contrac-
tor guilty of a misdemeanor for which he may be imprisoned for up to six months and
fined up to $1000 and the City's Corporation Counsel may seek an injunction against
anyone violating these laws. Unfortunately, in reality prosecutors and judges in New
York's overloaded criminal courts give low priority to these offenses. The contractor
must be found by a DCA inspector and served with a summons. If he bothers to appear
in Criminal Court, he will likely be fined $25. If he prefers not to respond to the sum-
mons, the court will issue a bench warrant. However, it will never be served and noth-
ing will happen to him.
[Vol. 1985
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tract properly or a violation of any DCA substantive rule, the file is referred to
the Calendar Division to schedule a formal consumer redress hearing. Either
the Home Improvement Division or the Calendar Division may detail a special
DCA inspector with construction experience to visit the site and report on the
source of the consumer's problems. The inspector will report whether the work
conforms to contract specifications and, if the work is inadequate, what must
be done to make it conform.
Redress hearings may be conducted by full-time DCA hearing officers or
by other specially assigned DCA employees. The parties and any witnesses
they bring are given a turn to be heard. If an inspection has been done, the
special inspector also appears as a witness. The hearing officer often tries to
mediate the dispute by eliciting concessions from both sides that the other has
proceeded in good faith, working out a mutually agreed upon list of outstand-
ing problems, and suggesting specific solutions." Agreements reached at the
hearing are incorporated into a consent order, which has the same effect as a
formal decision by the hearing officer. If the parties fail to reach an agreement
during the hearing, the hearing officer drafts a decision. This decision is ap-
proved by a superior officer,"3 mailed to the parties, entered into the docket
file, and placed in a book of collected DCA decisions. Appeal is possible under
"Article 78"" to the Appellate Division of the state Supreme Court.
If a consumer complains that the contractor has not carried out his re-
sponsibilities under a DCA decision, DCA schedules a disciplinary hearing.
Although this phase is formally designed to punish the licensee for his disobe-
dience of a DCA order, in practice it is treated as a continuation of the effort
to obtain redress for the consumer. Thus, unless the contractor's behavior ap-
pears flagrant, he can delay the hearing by promising to get the work done, or
completely avoid the hearing by actually doing the work. Indeed, the most
likely result of a disciplinary hearing is that the contractor will be fined $50
and given another fifteen days or so to carry out the original order and avoid
suspension or revocation of his license.
If a contractor fails to appear at a disciplinary hearing or if a consumer
reports a contractor has not complied with a second order, DCA will quickly
order the contractor's license suspended or revoked. Even at this point, the
contractor can, in practice, get the suspension or revocation order rescinded
before it becomes effective by complying with all DCA orders then outstand-
12. One of the hearing officers who handled much of the home improvement
caseload attempted to mediate whenever the contractor gave any indication of good
faith. Although he was very successful, most of the others seemed less comfortable with
the mediation role and tried it much less frequently.
13. During the period under study, this was done first by a Deputy Commis-
sioner, and following an administrative reorganization by the Director of Adjudication.
In either case, the review was generally limited to whether the relief granted was
within DCA's jurisdiction, and to questions of writing style.
14. N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE LAW & RULES, art. 78.
1985]
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ing against him. Once his license is revoked, the price goes up. He will have to
make a deal with the Advocacy Division - which normally involves satisfying
any existing orders and any newly-arrived consumer complaints, as well as
paying a substantial penalty to DCA - before he will be permitted to have
another license.
This dispute resolution process is little known except by New York City
home improvement contractors, and their dissatisfied customers. Nonetheless,
DCA's process for providing redress to dissatisfied home improvement con-
sumers has five structural advantages over most other dispute resolution
processes. These advantages make it a promising model for providing effective
relief to consumers.
First, it costs consumers almost nothing to use, since there are no filing
fees and attorneys are unnecessary. Second, it offers the full relief of specific
performance rather than the limited amount of damages which are allowed in
small claims court. Third, it makes use of expert fact-finding in a technical
area in which the typical judge or small claims arbitrator is at sea (and hence
may lean too heavily on "credibility" determinations). Fourth, it is supported
by a powerful sanction-license revocations-that is not available to other dis-
pute-settlement tribunals. Finally, it is capable of handling a large number of
consumer complaints at a reasonable cost.
II. How WELL DOES IT WORK?
To what extent does DCA's consumer redress process for home improve-
ment complaints realize these apparent structural advantages in practice? Is it
really cost-effective? Does it provide a service worth continuing in New York
City, emulating in other jurisdictions, and extending to consumers of other
goods and services?
A study designed to answer these questions needs some point of reference
against which to compare DCA's performance for home improvement consum-
ers. The obvious candidate is New York City's small claims courts. Small
claims courts in general, and New York City's in particular,"b have been
widely studied and they are the alternative dispute resolution forums most
often mentioned in a discussion of consumer justice. Aside from ordinary
courts, the small claims court provides the only forum other than the DCA in
which a dissatisfied New York City purchaser of home improvement can ob-
tain a remedial order which is legally binding upon the contractor. Finally,
comparing the results obtained in the two forums may bring into focus some of
the relative strengths and weaknesses of judicial versus administrative
tribunals.
15. See, e.g., Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing. Litigation in a Small
Claims Court, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 339 (1976); Note, How to Defeat the Jurisdic-
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This study begins by comparing the results of ninety-two complaints
against home improvement contractors filed with DCA with the results of
fifty-three complaints filed in Brooklyn with New York City's small claims
court in 1978.1" The files were carefully checked to determine the fate of the
complaint, and where the file left open any doubt the consumer was contacted
by telephone. In addition, during 1978 I examined thirty-nine formal DCA
decisions issued in home improvement cases and sat through forty-three DCA
hearings.
A. The Reference Point: Results in Small Claims Court
Since the DCA procedures for dealing with licensed and unlicensed con-
tractors are so different, the cases in each sample have been grouped sepa-
rately for licensed and unlicensed contractors to increase comparability. Table
I describes how the consumers in the small claims court sample fared at each
stage of that process.
16. Once I had rejected the Manhattan court because of its likely paucity of
home improvement claims, I chose the Brooklyn Small Claims Court, more formally
the "Civil Court of the City of New York, Small Claims Part, Kings County," because
it was the most accessible to my temporary office at DCA. I examined 4500 sequen-
tially numbered claims, which were filed over a three month period.
5
Daynard: Daynard: Redress by a Licensing Authority:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985























- 0 eN of ~
- o~of ~
o ~ ~O eNf ~
5
0E 8
-.=0 0 0 c 0









Daynard: Daynard: Redress by a Licensing Authority:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985















C ~ 15 Z F-


























Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1985, Iss.  [1985], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1985/iss/7
HOME IMPROVEMENT DISPUTES
Table 2 summarizes the results achieved. Since in twenty-three of the
fifty-three sample cases the available information was inadequate to determine
whether the consumer received substantial redress, I experimented with in-
creasing the data base by making some educated guesses. Thus, on the basis of
my experience with other cases, I tried reallocating the "Notice Returned,
Undelivered" cases to the "Received No Redress" category, and the "Dis-
missed, No Appearance Either Side" cases as well as the "Settled in court"
cases to the "Received Substantial Redress" category. As Table 2 indicates,
this reallocation makes little difference in the results achieved. Overall, the
process achieved indifferent success, but the effect of whether or not the con-
tractor was licensed was remarkable. Consumers who complained against li-
censed contractors ordinarily obtained substantial redress, but those who com-
plained against unlicensed contractors received satisfaction only occasionally.
TABLE 2: Analysis of Table I by Proportion Receiving Substantial Redress (Excluding "No
Information" and "Other"), With and Without Reallocation of "No Information"
Proportion*
Proportion* Receiving Receiving
Did the Consumer Receive Substantial Substantial Redress, Substantial Redress,
Redress)? (No Reallocation) (With Reallocation)
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS LICENSED)
YES 91% (10/11) 88% (14/16)
NO 9% (1/1l) 13% (2/16)
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS NOT LICENSED)
YES 17% (2/12) 24% (5/21)
NO 83% (10/12) 76% (16/21)
(ALL CASES COMBINED)
YES 52% (12/23) 51% (19/37)
NO 48% (11/23) 49% (18/37)
*Note to Table 2: Proportions rounded to the nearest percent.
B. Success of Consumers at DCA
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TABLE 3: Results of Complaints to DCA Contractor's Statusa
Did the Consumer Receive Redressb?
Unlicensed Licensed Total
RECEIVED SUBSTANTIAL REDRESS, DUE TO FILING COMPLAINT
Hearing Not Involved 7 16 23
After Notice of Hearing, but Before Hearing n.a.C 5
At or After Hearing n.a. 5 5
[Total] [7] 126] 133]
RECEIVED NO REDRESS, THOUGH PRESUMABLY ENTITLED
Contractor Out-of-Businessd 10 3 13
Remainder 18 2 20
[Total] [28] [5] [33]
OTHER
No Information 2 2 4
Consumer Not Seeking Redress 2 1 3
Resolved Independently of DCA 3 2 5
Complaint Dismissed n.a. 4 4
Complaint Apparently Without Merit 1 2 3
Partial Redress 2 5 7
[Total] [10] [16] [26]
TOTAL 45 47 92
Footnotes to Table 3:
a "Licensed" means the contractor was licensed both at the time the contract was made and
at the time the complaint was filed. All other contractors are classified as "unlicensed." It is
possible to divide the latter category into those who were never licensed (34 in the sample), those
who were licensed when the contract was made but were no longer licensed at the time of the
complaint (7), and those who had not been licensed at the time of the complaint but obtained a
license thereafter (4). Preliminary statistical analysis demonstrated that the behavior of the con-
tractors in the sample who had licenses at some but not all points in the process was indistinguish-
able from that of contractors who were never licensed.
b This has the same meaning as it did in Table 1. Here, there was somewhat less need to rely
on consumers' reports of what happened because DCA records are much more thorough than
small claims court records, and frequently contain "objective" evidence of whether work had been
done.
c "n.a." = "not applicable."
d This category includes only cases where a DCA inspector determined that the contractor
had actually moved without forwarding address or gone entirely out of this business, and excludes
cases where the contractor continues on with a new trade or corporate name. I have separated out
this category since a different set of reforms (e.g. bonding requirements) would be needed to
attempt to make this group of contractors amenable to DCA or other dispute resolution processes
than might theoretically suffice in the case of people still in the home improvement business in
New York City.
Table 4 summarizes the success achieved by DCA complainants. Since
there were only four "No Information" cases in this sample (as opposed to
twenty-three in the small claims court sample), no attempt has been made to
redistribute these.
10
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Table 4: Analysis of Table 3 by Proportion Receiving Substantial Redress (Excluding "Other")
Proportion Receiving
Did the Consumer Receive Substantial Redress? Substantial Redress
(CASES WHERE CONTRACTOR IS LICENSED)
YES 84% (26/31)
NO 16% (5/31)






As a whole, consumers had indifferent success bringing complaints
against home improvement contractors to DCA, achieving substantial redress
only half of the time. However, consumers did extraordinarily well when they
proceeded against licensees, getting what they wanted five-sixths of the time.
Conversely, they did extraordinarily poorly when they pursued unlicensed con-
tractors, obtaining redress only one-fifth of the time.
C. Comparison of Results Obtained in the Two Forums
In comparing Table 2 with Table 4, it is clear there is no significant dif-
ference between the results obtained in the two forums, irrespective of whether
one focuses on cases involving licensed contractors, unlicensed contractors, or
both. The fact that two quite different processes produce such similar results
suggests that they are pressing asymptotically against some externally imposed
limits. The fact that both forums do equally well in dealing with licensed con-
tractors, and equally poorly in dealing with unlicensed contractors, suggests
that these limits derive from distinguishing characteristics of the contractor
population which go beyond merely possessing or not possessing a DCA li-
cense. Although whether or not one has a license is a critical variable for the
DCA process, it is almost irrelevant to the small claims court process."
17. "'Almost," because DCA Gen. Reg. 7, supra note 10, requires licensees ei-
ther to pay, arrange for the payment of, or appeal small claims court judgments within
thirty days of their entry; however, it is unlikely that fear of DCA sanctions for violat-
ing this rule is a significant motivating factor for the good faith and compliance gener-
ally shown by licensed contractors who are brought into small claims court.
This is because the rule is enforced in two ways: by the contractors' certifications
in their biennial license renewal applications that they are not presently in violation,
and by consumers' complaints to DCA that the rule has been violated in their own
cases (which result in DCA orders that the judgments be paid). This enforcement
scheme is loose enough that a recalcitrant licensee could in practice avoid paying some
of his judgments without facing any sanctions, and could delay paying any judgments
until either the consumer brought a DCA complaint or the biennial renewal time was
upon him. But as Table I demonstrates, licensees rarely drag out the small claims
19851
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Although a license is not a cause of subsequent behavior, the decision of a
contractor whether or not to obtain the legally requisite license appears to be
an index of his underlying character and willingness to comply with social
demands. Although it is illegal, it is possible to do business as a home im-
provement contractor in New York City without a DCA license; a fact at-
tested to by the fifty-fifty distribution of licensed and unlicensed contractors in
the combined small claims court and complaints sample. 8 An unwillingness to
obtain a license is a good predictor of an unwillingness to bear the usually
greater expenses of rectifying consumers' justified complaints since a two-year
license could be obtained for $100 and the bother of filling out a few forms.
D. Quality of Remedies Provided in the Two Forums
In terms of remedies, the same rules apply in small claims court as in a
court of general jurisdiction except that the judge or arbitrator hearing the
case can award only money up to $1000 plus court costs. If the claim is worth
more than $1000 the consumer must either write off the amount above $1000
or hire a lawyer to bring the case in Civil Court. If there really is no adequate
remedy at law, the consumer must look elsewhere for relief.
While small claims remedies look like those of a common law court,
DCA's remedies are rather like those of a court of equity. The Commissioner
of Consumer Affairs is empowered by the New York City License Enforce-
ment Law of 1973 "upon due notice and hearing" to determine whether the
City's licensing laws and regulations have been violated and to "arrange for
the redress of injuries caused by such violations." 19 The Home Improvement
Business Law of 1968 is a licensing law under which home improvement con-
tractors are prohibited from: "Abandonment or willful failure to perform,
without justification, any home improvement contract or project engaged in or
undertaken by a contractor; or willful deviation from or disregard of plans or
process or fail to pay settlements or judgments.
Furthermore, my strong impression after talking with many consumers who have
received redress from licensees is that the principal reason that licensees either settled
or complied with an order is that they were law-abiding and reasonably responsible
people who would never seriously contemplate behaving differently. This impression
was buttressed by the unanimous opinion of DCA employees involved in the complaint,
enforcement, and adjudication processes with whom I spoke; by the responses of licen-
sees whom I interviewed; as well as by my own response to observations of licensees in
the 43 DCA hearings I attended; and by the correspondence in the 82 additional case
files I examined.
18. Other than the barely enforced criminal sanctions discussed at supra note
11, unlicensed contractors also face an inability to obtain building permits. But many
home improvements do not require building permits even in theory, and most do not
require them in practice.
19. DCA LICENSE ENFORCEMENT LAW, supra note 11, at Title A § 773-4.0(e).
[Vol. 1985
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specifications in any material respect without the consent of the owner."20
There is no definition of "redress of injuries" in the statute nor in any
DCA regulation. Neither is "redress of injuries" a legal term of art which
imports an intent by the City Council to incorporate by reference a system of
legal orequitable remedies. Nonetheless, DCA hearing officers firmly believe
that they are without authority to award "damages." 21 They are, however,
perfectly willing to award restitution and specific performance, and (unlike
equity courts) 22 will do so regardless of whether there would also be an "ade-
quate remedy at law."
Typical consumer relief awarded by DCA includes specific performance 23
or restitution.2 4 On the other hand, the restriction against awarding "dam-
ages" prevents any consequential damages,25 incidental damages,26 or liqui-
dated damages,2 7 even if those amounts would be less than the total amount
the contractor has received from the consumer. Most important, the restriction
precludes remedial orders requiring the contractor to pay the consumer what
20. DCA HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINEss LAW, supra note 9.
21. Perhaps this belief reflects a sense deeply ingrained in lawyers that award-
ing damages is the core function and peculiar province of courts. This is demonstrated
by the logical evasions and legal fictions which courts have used to approve the admin-
istrative determination of workers' compensation claims. The classic case is Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), which validated this practice on the theory that the ad-
ministrative fact-finders were agents of the court (despite the fact that they were firmly
imbedded in the executive branch). A few state courts have refused to engage in
double-talk and have struck down statutes delegating such powers to administrators as
violative of their state constitutions. See, e.g., State v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 316
P.2d 1069 (1957). The New York Court of Appeals, however, early on accepted the
propriety of such administrative adjudication. See, e.g., Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice
Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 173 N.E. 507 (1916).
22. Equity courts historically would not grant any remedies if there were an
adequate remedy at law available. Of course, equitable remedies and legal remedies are
now usually administered by the same courts, but the courts apply the traditional rules
of equity courts in determining when equitable remedies are appropriate.
23. "Specific performance" generally took the form of ordering the contractor
to finish the job or make repairs within a given time from the date of the order, some-
times conditioned upon the consumer making provision for paying the contractor
amounts due him under the contract.
24. "Restitution" took the form of an order requiring repayment to the con-
sumer of a deposit or of part or all of the contract price paid, the recovery sometimes
being measured by the cost incurred by the consumer in having someone else do the
job.
25. "Consequential damages," in this context, refers to harm to other property
of the consumer resulting from the contractor's breach.
26. "Incidental damages," in this context, refers to awards measured by wages
lost or frustration incurred while waiting futilely for the contractor to appear.
27. "Liquidated damages," in this context, refers to awards measured by an
agreed-upon penalty for missing a deadline.
19851
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another contractor would charge to finish or repair the job.
Thus, each of the two jurisdictions is hobbled in a different and comple-
mentary way. Hypothetically, a sophisticated consumer could choose his forum
based on the preferred remedies but, in reality, few consumers are aware of
the range of remedies offered by each forum. Perhaps, the remedial policies of
each forum should be changed to include the most useful remedies offered by
the other. As things now stand however, even if a consumer gets a remedy, the
value of that remedy depends on chance: the accident of how closely the reme-
dies offered in the forum the customer picked fit the needs of his particular
situation.
In most circumstances, the specific performance remedy offered by DCA
is preferable to the damage remedy offered in small claims court. If the rem-
edy is effective, the consumer gets what he contracted for without having to
prove the market value of the work or finding some other contractor to actu-
ally do it for that price. The contractor is better off with this remedy than with
contract damages, which would require him to pay another contractor's retail
price. An order to complete or to repair can be satisfied by the contractor for
the cost of labor and materials, or perhaps for even less where only his per-
sonal efforts are involved and he is less than fully employed. The original con-
tractor also has an advantage over another contractor because he has already
completed the time-consuming step of learning the job requirements. Indeed,
in the DCA cases I studied specific performance was the usual relief granted
and the typical settlement agreed to by the parties at DCA hearings. Further-
more, the work was almost always carried out.2 18
There are four potential problems with the use of the specific performance
remedy in home improvement cases. The first problem is determining precisely
what remains to be done. The second is determining if the order was ever
properly carried out. The third is guaranteeing that the contractor is paid once
he does the required work. The fourth is reassuring the consumer about con-
tinuing to deal with a contractor with whom he has developed an adversary
relationship. The DCA process deals effectively with each of these problems.
The first and second problems go to the nature of the fact-finding process.
Small claims court judges and arbitrators must rely on the testimony of the
parties to the action, lay and occasional expert witnesses brought in by the
consumer and the contractor's employees. Even if the lay witnesses testify in
perfectly good faith, they may not be able to offer more than a guess as to the
industry standard for materials or workmanship or the cause of any problems
occurring after the job was completed. The contractor, his employees, and any
28. In 21 of the 37 DCA decisions which I sampled, DCA ordered the contrac-
tor (usually after a special inspection and/or a settlement) to do further work on the
job. Of the 17 of these in which I could confirm whether the ordered work was done,
the work had indeed been completed in 16 cases. The only reason the work had not
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experts whom the parties produce may have accurate knowledge, but it is fre-
quently difficult for the fact finder to assess their accuracy and it is usually
impossible for him to know whether or not they are telling the truth. DCA, on
the other hand, has the benefit of its special inspector who is experienced and
knowledgeable in construction matters. This DCA employee can visit the job
site and testify as to what he has seen, his judgment as to whether the work
conforms to contract specifications, and his judgments as to the cause of any
subsequent problems.
In a number of cases in my sample, the critical factor in the success of
DCA's mediation efforts and its mandatory remedial processes appeared to be
the availability of the special inspector. At hearings in which the special in-
spector testified or where his reports were accepted into evidence without ob-
jection, the inspector's judgments, though not always undisputed, were always
the best evidence available on contract compliance and problem causation.
The only case in my sample in which the special inspector's judgment was not
accepted by the hearing officer involved a disagreement over the "legal" ques-
tion of the appropriateness of a remedy in a given factual situation, not a
disagreement over the issue of causation and compliance.
The third problem, the contractor's concern over whether the now alien-
ated consumer will pay, is handled by DCA in a number of ways. One
method, which is described below, actually works to reduce the level of antag-
onism between the parties. If, however, the hearing officer shares the contrac-
tor's concern that the consumer may not pay, the officer may make the order
requiring the contractor to perform conditional upon the consumer paying the
contractor in advance or placing the remainder of the price in escrow. Under
another option, the DCA special inspector may be required to certify the com-
pletion of payment. Finally, DCA may deny relief entirely where it is con-
vinced of the bad faith of the consumer.
Nonetheless, the antagonism between the parties is the principal deterrent
to an order for specific performance and a major impediment to obtaining the
benefit of such an order where it is issued. One or both parties may be irri-
tated, frustrated, disappointed, or even frightened, as a result of the other
party's past performance. Typical consumer complaints include missed ap-
pointments, unanswered phone calls, and sloppy work. Contractors complain of
belated changes of mind, unreasonable interpretations of the contract specifi-
cations, and tardy payments. At the beginning of the hearings I attended, con-
sumers' attitudes towards their contractors ranged from ever-hopeful, through
skeptical, to adamant. Contractors' attitudes ranged from sheepish or eagerly
cooperative, through wary, to incredulous.
The remedial problems posed by continued antagonism between the par-
ties are greater where specific relief is ordered than where legal damages are
involved. Specific performance requires that the parties once more deal with
each other, usually face-to-face, whereas legal damages can be satisfied with a
check in the mail or through the intervention of a third party, like a sheriff or
marshal. The consumer who is awarded specific performance but not reassured
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about the intentions of the contractor is unlikely to feel he is getting much
relief. Similarly, settlements are unlikely where mutual suspicion is high, and
an order to the contractor to resume a relationship with someone whom he
distrusts is likely to be viewed as foolish or unfair, and tempt him to ignore,
evade, or subvert it. Therefore, it is important that DCA hearing officers do
their best to reduce the antagonism between the parties.
Although the hearing officer only sees the parties for about one hour, a
surprising amount of effective conciliation actually occurred at the hearings I
witnessed. One hearing officer was a particularly deft mediator and conciliator
and in at least five instances I observed parties who had entered his hearing
room tense and glowering at each other leave looking greatly relieved, discuss-
ing amiably the arrangements for doing the necessary work. He accomplished
this result by patiently eliciting points of agreement, constantly restating any
inference of good faith by either party which could be drawn from the evi-
dence at the hearing, and refusing to let either party dwell on the slights and
insults suffered in the course of their relationship.
E. Recommended Changes in DCA and Small Claims Court Powers and
Procedures
For the largest category of home improvement complaints, the optimal
remedy would normally be a sequenced combination of DCA's characteristic
"Go back and finish (or fix) it!" followed by the small claims court's "Pay the
consumer the cost of having someone finish (or fix) it!". The first part of the
sequence alone would usually be adequate; the latter part of the remedy would
need to be invoked only where the contractor had proven himself either incom-
petent or unwilling to do the required work.
Proof of incompetence or unwillingness might be adduced at the first
hearing either by the position which the contractor takes at the hearing ("I
absolutely can't do it" or "I absolutely won't do it"), or by a showing of very
poor previous behavior. However, any substantial evidence of incompetence or
unwillingness following an initial order of specific performance should, at the
consumer's option, result in a prompt judgment for damages. While the advan-
tages of specific performance and the possibility for conciliation at a properly
run hearing are sufficiently great that damages should generally be avoided
initially, it is unfair to make a consumer who has already been wronged en-
dure more of the same once it becomes clear that the tribunal's order has not
provided sufficient impetus for change.
Although both small claims court and DCA have on occasion jerryrigged
this sequenced remedy, neither tribunal has the clear power to order both
parts of it. Granting both forums the requisite authority would not require
providing either one with additional enforcement mechanisms. The initial or-
der in small claims court could provide that:
Defendant shall take the following steps within - days:
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Claimant may any time thereafter notify the Clerk of the Court if the speci-
fied work has not been properly done. The Clerk shall schedule the case for a
rehearing at the earliest date convenient to the claimant, and shall notify both
parties. If at the rehearing the claimant proves that the specified work was
not properly done, the judgment shall be entered for the claimant in the sum
of $.4the best estimate of the cost of procuring the specified work and
materials, plus $200 penalty, plus normal court costs, should be entered here
as part of the initial order].
The initial order at DCA could provide that:
The licensee shall take the following steps within - days:
The consumer may any time thereafter notify the Calendar Division if the
specified work has not been properly done. The Calendar Division may, in
consultation with the hearing officer who heard the complaint initially, sched-
ule a Special Inspection and a rehearing as soon as possible thereafter; other-
wise, it shall schedule a rehearing as soon as possible. If upon rehearing the
Department concludes that the specified work has not been properly done, it
shall order the licensee to pay the consumer the sum of $-[the best esti-
mate of the cost of procuring the specified work and materials should be en-
tered here as part of the initial order], and shall also order the licensee to pay
the Department a civil penalty of $200. The failure of the licensee to pay both
sums within 15 days of the order to do so shall result in the revocation of his
license.
Although legislation is needed to grant small claim courts the power to make
and enforce the above orders, DCA probably has this power already.
The proposed procedure would improve the responsiveness of contractors
in both forums because the $200 penalty, which would be assessed if the work
is not done within the specified time, regardless of the contractor's excuse, is
likely to reduce foot-dragging. This procedure would not, however, affect con-
tractors who are effectively outside the jurisdiction of both tribunals: unli-
censed contractors who are difficult to locate for service of process 29 or who
have no substantial easily identified assets. I know of nothing, short of unrea-
sonably expensive public education or law enforcement campaigns, to put
these contractors out of business or to make them amenable to consumer re-
dress efforts.
III. IS IT WORTH THE COSTS?
A. What Are The Costs?
The previous sections of this article have described DCA's redress proce-
dure for home improvement cases and compared its effectiveness with that of
small claims courts. The evidence suggests that DCA produces substantial re-
dress for the same proportion of consumer complaints as does the small claims
29. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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court, that DCA's fact-finding process is more accurate, and that DCA's rem-
edies are somewhat preferable, although still imperfect. The question of how
efficient DCA's redress mechanism is in light of its costs to consumers, con-
tractors, and taxpayers remains. This section will attempt to evaluate the costs
and benefits of this procedure and compare them with the costs and benefits of
small claims court in an effort to determine whether DCA's redress mecha-
nism is worth maintaining and emulating.
Cost and benefit data are calculated on a weighted basis reflecting the
distribution of total cases in the sample at the different stages of the processes
at which they were resolved (or came to grief). Only monetary costs and bene-
fits are considered; the costs of time spent or the disappointment and frustra-
tion where no effective remedy was forthcoming, and the benefits-such as a
sense of vindication or satisfaction at one's personal effectiveness, or the reduc-
tion in tension where a reconciliation occurred-are left to the reader to esti-
mate and factor in. Even monetary costs are squishier than my numbers would
suggest, since they are based in part on estimates of the wages and profits
foregone in pursuing or responding to these procedures. The numbers are,
however, valuable for purposes of comparison and as indications of orders of
magnitude.30
The average case brought by a consumer against a home improvement
contractor in New York City's small claims court cost the consumer $9.533,
and the average benefit to a claimant was $88.20. 31 From the consumer's point
of view, small claims court is a good financial investment. The average cost to
a consumer of following the DCA route was $5.80,33 about 60% of the $9.53
30. Both costs and benefits are stated in terms of 1978 prices. While it would be
easy to update the cost estimates, the benefits at least in small claims court are mea-
sured by the actual amount received in 1978. It is reasonable to assume that costs and
benefits in each forum have been affected about equally by inflation, and that the ratios
of costs and benefits in each forum, as well as the comparisons between the two forums,
will remain relatively stable.
3 1. The total cost of $476.40 divided by the 50 cases which were not voluntarily
removed by the claimants from small claims court, yields an average cost to the con-
sumer of $9.53 per case. This breaks down to 22 cases at $4.40 in which the case never
went to hearing ($2.00 filing fee, $1.40 certified mail notice fee, and a $1.00 round-trip
on the subway to file the complaint); four cases at $6.00 each ($1.00 for transportation
to file the claim and $5.00 estimated costs for attending the hearing) where the con-
sumer definitely recouped his fees but only after attending a hearing (perhaps accom-
panied by a friend or witness); 16 cases in which the consumer appeared at a hearing
but probably did not recoup her fees (at $4.40 + $5.00 = $9.40 per case); six cases
which required two appearances (at $14.40 per case); two cases requiring three appear-
ances (at $19.40 per case); plus $80 in unrecouped sheriff's and process server's costs
for the entire sample.
32. Based on recoveries in I I of the 50 cases in which the consumer definitely
received either monetary or easily monetized redress. The average recovery in these I I
cases was $401; the median recovery was $270.
33. Based on $36 in subway tokens for the 36 consumers in the complaints sam-
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average cost of pursuing a similar case in small claims court against a similar
defendant.3 4
Defendants' procedural costs (costs other than damages paid to claim-
ants) in small claims court ranged from nothing, for defendants who settle
before the hearing or evade notice or execution, to as high as $163.40 for a
defendant who appears at a hearing with an employee-witness and an attor-
ney-and loses.36 The cost to the average defendant who actually appears at
one or more small claims court hearings is $88.70, but the cost to the average
defendant in the small claims court group (most of whom never appear in
court) was $29.20. These figures seem reasonable in relation to the average
($401) and median ($270) recoveries where the consumer prevails, as well as
to the average ($2,091) and median ($1,536) contract sizes.
Procedural costs for contractors brought before DCA range from zero for
unlicensed contractors who are totally unmoved by DCA's letters and sum-
monses, through a few dollars for time spent writing letters or making phone
calls to explain that the problem had been or was being resolved, to $215.50
for a lawyer, two partners, and an employee-witness. 36 The cost to the average
contractor who appears at one or more DCA hearings was $47.43, but the
average cost to a responding contractor (licensed or unlicensed) was $9.93,37
which is substantially below the contractor's $29.20 cost in small claims court.
The cost difference is fully accounted for by the fact that contractors felt
obliged to bring lawyers much more frequently in small claims court than at
pie who filed their complaints in person; $28 (in postage and xeroxing) spent by the 56
consumers who filed their complaints by mail; $30 in tokens spent by the 12 consumers
(accompanied on average by one other person) in the sample who attended a total of 15
hearings; $300 in lost wages (on the assumptions that for half the hearings either the
consumer or someone in his party was losing a half day's wage; $40 for the plumber
whom one consumer brought with him, and $100 for the attorney whom another con-
sumer brought along). The $534 total, divided by the 92 complaints, yields an average
costs per complaint of $5.80.
34. Benefits from the DCA process, unlike those from small claims court, are
not easily quantifiable, since DCA decisions do not speak in quantitative terms.
35. Based on $30 each for two hours of the contractor's and his employee's
time, $100 for the attorney, and $3.40 for court costs.
36. These calculations do not include any fraction of each contractor's $50 per
year license fee. This fee is not directly related to DCA's consumer redress procedure,
and is similar to license fees for occupations in which redress hearings are rare. The fee
does however produce some revenue even after subtracting licensing costs: this revenue
may be seen as contributing to the taxpayers' cost of operating the consumer redress
mechanism. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
37. Based on $1 average cost per complaint of responding to DCA's initial let-
ter for each of the 92 cases in the complaints sample; $22.50 in time lost attending a
special inspection in one case; and $799.02 total hearing and special inspection costs for
the fourteen contractors who attended such a hearing (involving a total of 18 hearings,
at $36.89 per hearing, plus six special inspections). Dividing the total by the 92 com-
plaints yields $9.93 in contractor's procedural costs per complaint.
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The cost to the taxpayers is often ignored in evaluating consumer reme-
dies. I estimate that New York City's small claims courts cost the taxpayers
$1,738,302 in 1979.31 When divided by the 62,463 claims filed there in 1978,
the cost per claim was $28.55. After subtracting the $2.00 filing fee paid by
the claimant, the taxpayers picked up $26.55 per case. Of 4,500 consecutive
cases filed in the Brooklyn small claims court, 53 were consumer claims
against home improvement contractors. If this proportion (1.178%) holds true
for the City as a whole, approximately 736 cases would be of this variety. If
each one cost the taxpayers $26.55, the total public subsidy for claims brought
in small claims court would have been $19,541. While higher filing fees would
have reduced this subsidy, substantially higher fees would tend to defeat the
purpose of small claims courts.
Table 5A presents the cost to the taxpayers of operating DCA's redress
mechanism for home improvement consumers in more detail. For each func-
tion (docketing, Home Improvement Division, field offices, Calendar, hearing
officers, and Director of Adjudication), cost data for: (1) personnel (including
an additional 40.5% for fringe benefits and municipal personnel services); (2)
other-than-personnel-services (OTPS) plus departmental overhead, based on
the fraction of the 325 DCA employees assigned to that function multiplied by
the total departmental OTPS plus overhead ($750,000 OTPS $427,120 over-
head); (3) the number of employees assigned to that function (i.e. the numera-
tor of the previous fraction); (4) total yearly costs; (5) the proportion of costs
attributable to home improvement consumer redress functions; and (6) the
amount of costs so attributable, are given.
Table 5B computes the cost of DCA's consumer redress process by ad-
ding: (1) the sum of the portion of the costs of the six functions attributable to
home improvement consumer redress functions from Table 5A; (2) 30% of the
$30,000 cost of the transcription contract; (3) the entire $17,000 cost of the
contract with the special inspector; plus (4) $12,000, representing a rough esti-
mate of the portion devoted to home improvement redress cases of the costs of
the City Corporation Counsel's Office (which supposedly prosecutes unlicensed
contractors), of DCA's Consumer Advocate's Office, and of the person at
DCA who works as liaison with the Corporation Counsel's Office. The result-
38. In five of the 16 cases in which a contractor appeared in small court court
he was accompanied by his lawyers, whereas in only two of the 41 cases in the DCA
hearings sample did a lawyers for the contractor appear. It seems that a substantial
proportion of people sued in small claims court feel uncomfortable defending them-
selves without the aid of an attorney, while the great majority of licensed contractors
feel that they can navigate a DCA hearing without professional assistance.
39. This is based on a detailed breakdown of personnel and other costs. It in-
cludes an allocation of general New York City Civil Court expenses based on the pro-
portion of specifically detailed Civil Court personnel who are assigned to small claims
functions. The precise calculations are on file with the Mo. J. DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
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ing figure, the total yearly cost of DCA's home improvement consumer redress
functions (excluding licensing costs), is then divided by the number of com-
plaints against home improvement contractors in 1978 (1,841) to produce a
figure for average costs to the taxpayer of DCA's handling this type of
complaint.
If the cost per complaint in Table 5B were compared with the cost to the
taxpayer in small claims court ($26.55), it appears that the DCA process is
much more expensive. Such a comparison would, however, be premature. The
license fees paid by home improvement contractors make a substantial contri-
bution to this cost (even after subtracting DCA's licensing costs), and a strong
argument can be made that these fees could and should be increased to cover
virtually the entire cost of DCA's consumer redress process.
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The cost of operating DCA's Licensing Division, including attributable
overhead, was $1,262,914 in 1978 and 13.19% of the licenses issued went to
home improvement contractors and licensees. Assuming the complexity of the
processes for issuing home improvement licenses is about average for DCA
(they may in fact be somewhat less complex than most), the share of the cost
attributable to home improvement licenses in $166,578. To this should be
added the $19,428 cost of 25% of the efforts of the Home Improvement Divi-
sion and the $8,000 cost for the combined efforts of people elsewhere in DCA,
the Corporation Counsel's office, and the Criminal Court which are devoted to
pressuring unlicensed contractors to obtain licenses. These calculations yield a
gross cost to the taxpayers of $194,007 for requiring home improvement con-
tractors and salesmen to be licensed.
Annual licensing revenues, at the existing fees of $50 for a contractor's
license and $25 for a salesman's license, yielded $235,175 in 1978. This left a
$41,168 surplus to be applied to the cost of operating the consumer redress
mechanism with respect to these categories. If so applied, the annual cost to
the taxpayers of this process drops from $197,579 to $156,411, and the cost
per complaint drops from $107.32 to $84.96. This amount is still large when
compared to the $26.55 cost of handling a small claims court complaint. How-
ever, if the license fee for a contractor were raised to $100 per year, and no
change were made in the license fee for salesmen, the total revenue from these
two categories of licensees in 1978 would have been $352,875 (on the assump-
tion that demand for contractor's licenses would drop by 10%).4o Even sub-
tracting the full $194,007 licensing costs from this leaves $158,868 to be ap-
plied against the $197,579 cost of operating the consumer redress mechanism,
leaving only $38,711 to be covered by the taxpayers. Dividing this by the
1,841 complaints brought to DCA against home improvement contractors in
1978 yields an average cost per complaint to the taxpayers of $21.03. This
latter figure is 20% less than the $26.55 per claim which taxpayers foot for
small claims court.
As the results of my complaints sample demonstrate, it is perfectly appro-
priate for home improvement contractors to bear the additional $50 per year
burden of helping to support this process. Thirty-one of the consumer com-
plaints against licensees were vindicated in the sense that the consumer re-
ceived complete or partial redress for his grievance, whereas in only six cases
of complaints against licensed contractors was the complaint either dismissed
or apparently without merit. There is no reason why businesses should not
bear the major part of the cost of a mechanism designed to insure that they
carry out their obligations. Even in those cases where the contractor prevails,
he has generally received a benefit-a public vindication, which decreases the
40. Given the fact that the average contract size for licensees in my complaints
sample was $2,832 (compared with $1,565 for unlicensed contractors), the additional
$50 per year seems an insignificant increase in their cost of doing business, making the
assumption of demand inelasticity plausible.
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likelihood that the consumer will pursue him in other forums or will disparage
his reputation to potential customers.
B. Why Have A DCA-Type Redress Mechanism When We Already Have
A Small Claims Court
The average complaint brought by a consumer against a home improve-
ment contractor at DCA cost the consumer $5.80, the contractor $9.93, and
the taxpayers $84.96,"1 for a total cost to all concerned of $100.69. These
amount to 61% of the cost to consumers in small claims court,"2 34% of the
cost to contractors, 320% of the cost to taxpayers, and 154% of the total costs
in small claims court.
Why then should this service be preserved, or instituted in a jurisdiction
which does not have it, if existing small claims courts provide a similar service
at a somewhat lower total cost per complaint? There are several answers to
this question.
First, although the proportion of consumers whose complaints were sub-
stantially satisfied was approximately the same for either process, the quality
of DCA's fact-finding, mediation, and conciliation processes, as well as the
appropriateness of its remedies to the problems presented, were generally
better.
Second, many more consumers who have had problems with home im-
provements make use of DCA than make use of small claims court where both
forums are available.43 The two processes are presented very differently to con-
sumers-DCA as "Call in (and then write us) about your consumer com-
plaints and we'll enforce the City's consumer protection laws on your behalf,"
small claims court as "If you want to sue someone this is the place to do it."
There is no reason to assume that most consumers who let DCA "carry the
ball" for them would be willing or able to take the initiatives of suing the
contractor (requiring at a minimum traveling to the court clerk's office and
laying out $3.40), assembling legally sufficient evidence, appearing at the
hearing (unless the contractor settles first), and finally investigating the con-
tractor's assets and presenting this information plus $10 to the sheriff (unless
the contractor pays the judgment voluntarily) which are necessary to prevail in
small claims court. Nor is there any reason to abandon the consumers who are
not sufficiently aggressive to navigate small claims court successfully. After
all, the great majority of the consumers are victims of injustices; they should
not be expected to make additional investments and learn new skills simply to
41. As concluded in Section A, supra, much of the taxpayers' burden might
properly be shifted to the contractors.
42. The DCA process is also significantly less bother, since unlike at small
claims court the consumer need not travel to a DCA office to file his complaint, and he
is only 27% as likely to have to attend a hearing.
43. In this study, 1,841 (250%) utilized DCA versus 736 for small claims court.
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obtain what they are due.
Third, DCA's consumer redress hearings are an inextricable part of its
process for enforcing behavioral standards upon home improvement contrac-
tors. The Home Improvement Business Law," DCA's Regulations Relating to
the Home Improvement Business, and DCA's General Regulation 7,41 all im-
pose requirements designed to prevent fraud, overreaching, and other unfair
practices. Violations come to the attention of DCA only through consumer
complaints. While DCA could enforce technical requirements, such as those
requiring certain information to appear on the contracts, without providing
further involvement and redress for the consumer, substantive requirements,
such as those requiring the contractor to refrain from "Abandonment or wilful
failure to perform, without justification, any home improvement con-
tract. . ."," can hardly be enforced without the consumer's active coopera-
tion. It is difficult to imagine a more effective incentive for this kind of cooper-
ation than the consumer's belief that he will personally benefit from
demonstrating the contractor's misfeasance. True, the practice of ordering
consumer redress in individual cases does not guarantee that contractors will
adhere to legal standards in future jobs, since they can continue to do nothing
until a complaint is brought, or even until a DCA sanction is about to be
imposed. 47 Nonetheless, the process serves as both a forceful reminder of the
applicable standards to those who would be disposed to obey them and as a
mild deterrent (via the time, bother, and embarrassment of responding to
DCA complaints) against violating them.
Fourth, consumer complaint handling is an ordinary and appropriate
function of local, county, and state government. Consumers today expect that
someone in government will at least write a letter or make a phone call on
their behalf if they allege that a businessman has defrauded them or otherwise
treated them badly. A government which attempts to abdicate their responsi-
bility entirely may not save much money, since it cannot avoid devoting some
manpower to dealing (one way or another) with consumers who insist they
have a right. New York City deals with consumer complaints generally by
directing them to the DCA field offices or to the Complaints Division. Either
way, DCA not only dockets each complaint filed but also assigns an employee
to attempt to resolve it. If home improvement complaints were no longer dif-
ferentiated and handled by a distinct division, they would have to be handled
by inspectors working for the Complaints Division. This would probably re-
quire an additional employee and associated expenses, as well as continuing
the existing docketing and field office expenses in this category, for an average
44. DCA HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINEss LAW, supra note 9, at § B32-
358.0(I).
45. See supra note 11.
46. DCA Gen. Reg. 7, supra note 10.
47. See supra note 17.
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cost of $24.67 for handling a complaint. 48 While this is far less than the
$107.32 which it presently costs if licensing revenues are not factored in, and
significantly less than the $84.96 cost per complaint when the excess of present
licensing revenues over costs is considered, it is more than the $21.03 per com-
plaint which the taxpayers would have to bear if the current licensing system
were retained but the fee for contractors was raised to $100 per year.
C. Should Licensing Authorities Offer Consumer Redress in Other
Contexts?
1. The Advantages
A consumer complaint resolution process culminating in consumer redress
hearings, decisions, and enforcement activity, which is administered by the au-
thority which licenses the businesses being complained against, has several ad-
vantages over other kinds of consumer dispute resolution processes.
First, the licensee's stake in any particular dispute should produce a high
level of compliance with the authority's orders, at least in those occupations
and industries in which the retention of one's license is a practical as well as
legal necessity. 4 1 With respect to other businesses, such as the home improve-
ment business in New York City, a license is valuable, but as a practical mat-
ter not absolutely necessary. However, the licensing authority has considerable
leverage even with this group: in the three DCA samples none of the home
improvement contractors who had once bothered to obtain a license was indif-
ferent to the prospect of losing it.
Any existing licensing authority whose licensees deal with consumers
could, if it were so authorized, use its leverage over licensees to obtain justice
for consumers in appropriate cases by means of a process like the one de-
scribed in this study. Licensing authority could also be granted over any pres-
ently unlicensed occupation or industry which deals with consumers expressly
to establish this type of redress process. Furthermore, means of increasing the
leverage of agencies such as DCA over existing categories of licensed busi-
nesses could be devised. They might include, for example, increasing the pen-
alties actually imposed on persons convicted of operating without a license, or
publicizing the fact that unlicensed contractors are not pemitted to use the
courts to recover from the consumer for unpaid work. 50
48. Docketing and field office expenses attributable to home improvement cases
total $25,425. Inspectors were paid about $20,000 with fringes. $25,425 plus $20,000
divided by 1,841 (the number of home improvement complaints) equals $24.67.
49. The occupations and industries in question include dentists, doctors, law-
yers, pharmicists, psychologists, veterinarians, optometrists, nurses, realtors, airlines,
interstate movers, taxicab owners, insurance companies, certified public accountants,
banks, utilities, and others. This list could, of course, be expanded.
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Second, the ability of the agency to perform on-site inspections (where
relevant), and to draw on the expertise of its staff in evaluating the available
information with respect to the matter under dispute, should produce more
accurate decisions.
Third, it is a very inexpensive forum for consumers. DCA's procedure is
40% less expensive for consumers than that of small claims court, but only a
small fraction of the cost of hiring a lawyer and going to a court of general
jurisdiction which, absent DCA, a consumer would have to do if his claim
exceeded the small claims court's $1,000 monetary limit. DCA has no upper
monetary limit on its subject matter jurisdiction, and there is no reason why
one should be imposed. True, decisions requiring the licensee to spend substan-
tially more than $1,000 are likely to be appealed to the courts, but the cost of
defending its decision in the courts is paid by the agency rather than by the
consumer.
Fourth, the agency is able to ensure that its regulations with respect to
the particular occupation or industry (which may be both detailed and differ-
ent from those applicable to other businesses), are applied in the resolution of
disputes. A small claims court judge or arbitrator, or other tribunal without a
subject-matter-specific jurisdiction, might not know about these regulations
and might instead apply "general"-and less appropriate-principles.
Fifth, the agency is in a position to take a consumer complaint which has
both remedial and disciplinary implications and deal with both aspects in-
house.
Sixth, the agency is in a position to monitor the complaints against indi-
vidual businesses, enabling it to distinguish licensees who occasionally, inad-
vertently, and excusably violate the consumer protection provisions from those
who are prime candidates for further investigations and possible disciplinary





There are, of course, several possible disadvantages to establishing this
type of consumer redress process.
First, it may entail additional costs to the taxpayers. These costs will be
greatest where the occupation or industry is not presently licensed, there is no
51. HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINEss LAW OF 1968, supra note 9 at § 332-357.0
empowers the Commissioner to fine the licensee up to $250 or to suspend or revoke his
license where "The business transactions of the contractor have been or are marked by
a practice of failure to timely perform or complete its contracts .... " A disciplinary
proceeding could presumably be brought pursuant to this provision based entirely on
the records of a series of consumer redress hearings in which the contractor's tardiness
or failure to complete had been demonstrated. I am not, however, aware of any such
proceeding having been brought.
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licensing authority handling similar types of activities whose jurisdiction could
be expanded, and there is no governmental organization systematically han-
dling complaints about the occupation or industry in question that could be
given licensing and redress authority as well. Where the activity is licensed, or
some government agency is presently handling complaints about it, some of
the costs of this process are already being borne. Even where the full cost of
the process would have to be covered from fresh sources, this cost could, and
should, frequently be covered by a modest license fee. 52
Second, it may mean one more bureaucracy. Whether this will be a new
or substantially expanded bureaucracy, rather than simply an added function
for an on-going one, depends on what is already in place. Even if a new bu-
reaucracy is entailed, it would be a combination of a court and law enforce-
ment agency-two exceptions to the current popular distaste for expanded
government. Furthermore, DCA tends to both relieve court congestion and
provide inexpensive and effective justice for people who cannot afford lawyers
or do not wish to have one.
Third, it may permit unfair exertion of overwhelming governmental
power aginst the small business. The very reasons why the licensee has to take
this process seriously can to used as an argument against the process. How-
ever, this argument is not valid if the procedure is fair. DCA's process, with its
detailed notice well before the hearing, its impartial hearing officers, all testi-
mony under oath, recorded, and if necessary transcribed, with opportunity to
bring counsel and to confront, cross-examine, and rebut adverse witnesses,
along with its right to a judicial review, is as fair a process as exists in our
legal system. A process with less procedural safeguards might, however, allow
an arbitrary government official to force a licensee to agree to a settlement not
required by legal principles.
Fourth, the agency may be captured by the industry it is trying to regu-
late. There is certainly a subtle process by which familiarity with an industry's
problems, and with some of its more likeable representatives, blunts one's ini-
tial consumerist zeal. For example, DCA's special inspector and its hearing
officers hold a lower performance standard for aluminum replacement win-
dows than the consumers who appear complaining of condensation and drafts.
Consumers tended to view the official's acceptance of the inevitability of cer-
tain problems with this type of window (an acceptance which apparently fol-
lowed years of experience with the problems) with great distrust. It was not
my impression that the hearing officers tilted unfairly either way-though af-
ter reading many files and attending many hearings I had become surprisingly
sympathetic to the industry's problems and to its more likeable representatives
as well. The consumers in some cases may have done better before a less
knowledgeable tribunal, but that does not mean that they were entitled to one.
There may, on the other hand, be more serious problems of "capture" in in-
dustries in which powerful and prestigious companies, trade associations, and
52. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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law firms are involved.
Fifth, the agency may be distracted by the consumer redress cases from
its more basic law enforcement mission. Although there may be a problem of
resource allocation, several of the "advantages" suggest various types of effi-
ciencies which result from combining both missions in one agency. More fun-
damentally, a redress-oriented process encourages the agency to obtain satis-
faction for the existing complainants, even if it is at the expense of permitting
a dishonestly inclined business to continue in operation. Similarly, a marginal
operator who makes a policy of satisfying those consumers (but only those
consumers!) who complain to the agency will be more likely to earn the
agency's respect and gratitude than to trigger its suspicions and a disciplinary
investigation.
This problem is real enough, but abstaining from formal consumer redress
endeavors is unlikely to solve it. Even a pure law enforcement agency will
sometimes be presented with the choice between retrospective relief for those
already injured and prospective relief for those who have not yet been affected.
Furthermore, limitations on prosecutorial resouces will rationally lead to fo-
cusing on offenders who have produced the greatest apparent damage. If
threats to go to the agency are the magic words which mobilize the errant
businessman into action, the damage which he has done to all those who utter
the "magic words" will not be apparent to the authority.
Finally, the cagy and determined scofflaw is likely to avoid both the
agency's consumer redress efforts and its disciplinary efforts. On the other
hand, the reminders of the law's requirements and of its possible sanctions
which are provided in the course of consumer redress proceedings are usually
enough to ensure greater adherence by the relatively law-abiding businessman
in the future.
IV. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING THE DCA PROCESS IN LIGHT OF THE
CONTINUING CRITIQUE OF LICENSING
Any proposal to extend licensing to yet another occupation confronts a
hostile intellectual environment. Occupational licensing schemes have been
frequently, vigorously, and effectively criticized on the bases that they may
unjustifiably restrict the constitutionally protected liberty to engage in the le-
gitimate occupation of one's choice, 11 that the consumer protection functions
which their supporters claim may have little reality other than as public rela-
tions, 5, and that their principal effects are typically to protect licensees from
53. See, e.g., Gellhorn, The Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 6, 15-19 (1976) [herinafter cited as Gellhorn]. See generally M. FRIEDMAN, CAP-
ITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); W. GELLHORN, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND GOVERN-
MENTAL RESTRAINT 107 (1956); F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944).
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competition at the consumer's expense. 5  These criticisms are similar to those
which have been made, to great intellectual and political effect, of the role of
federal regulation in transportation, banking, and other industries.5
A careful examination of DCA's licensing of home improvement contrac-
tors and salesmen reveals that none of these criticisms apply to it.
First, the restrictions imposed by this license requirement upon would-be
home improvement contractors or salesmen are minimal. Unlike many of the
controversial licensing schemes, there are no requirements that the applicant:
be a citizen of the United States or a resident of the licensing jurisidiction, 57
have prior experience in the business,58 have formal training,", or pass an ex-
amination."0 Nor has the contracting field been divided into specialties which
require a multiplicity of licenses (or of licensees within one's employ) to carry
on a non-specialized home improvement business."'
DCA requires a modest license fee ($50 for a two-year salesman's license,
$100 for a two-year contractor's license), three photographs of the applicant, a
trip to a police station to get fingerprinted (permitting DCA to check for a
possible criminal record), a simple application form, and a trip to DCA head-
quarters to file the form. In addition, applicants for contractors' licenses file
copies of their trade name or partnership certificates or corporate pa-
pers--documents which state law other than the licensing law require them to
have. Licenses can be denied only for failure to meet these requirements, for
failure to pay any small claims court judgment outstanding for more than
55. Id.; Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 13-19; Leffler, Physician Licensure: Compe-
tition and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J. LAW & ECON. 165 (1978);
Pashigian, Occupational Licensing and the Interstate Mobility of Professionals, 22 J.
LAW & EcON. 187 (1979); Shepard Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental
Care. 21 J. LAW & ECON. 187 (1978).
56. See G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN, AND H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (2d ed. 1980) (summary of the intellectual history of the "deregulation move-
ment" and of its principal criticisms, proposals, and achievements).
57. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 14-16.
58. Cf. Cathcart and Graff, Occupational Licensing: Factoring It Out, 9 PAC.
L. J. 147 (1978) [herinafter cited as Cathcart and Graff] "[T]he present array of expe-
rience requirements among the licensed occupations in California [are] utterly chaotic
and lack[ing] an overriding rationale." Id. at 148. The authors suggest that a rational
scheme might well insist upon some prior experience in the case of contractors. Id. at
156-163.
59. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 7-13. Gellhorn has the temerity to suggest
that even the educational requirements for doctors and lawyers may be a bit over-
drawn. Id. at 7.
60. Id. at 10-13.
61. See Cathcart and Graff, supra note 58, at 159 (listing 30 health professions
which have separate licensing requirements); cf. Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 16-17
(criticism of segmentation in the health-care field and proposals for mandatory spe-
cialty certification in the legal profession).
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thirty days at the time of the application, 62 or if the applicant is not "over 18
years of age and of good character."6 3 The mere possession of a criminal rec-
ord does not, however, disqualify an applicant in the absence of a "direct rela-
tionship between one or more of the previous criminal offenses and the specific
license . . . sought" or of "an unreasonable risk to property . . . or the general
public."6 4 While these requirements are all restrictions upon the liberty to en-
gage in the legitimate occupation of one's choice, none of them are
unjustifiable.
Second, if there was any doubt before this study of the consumer protec-
tion function served by DCA's licensing in the home improvement area, such
doubt is no longer possible. The licensing law states that:
It is the purpose of the city council in enacting this article to safeguard and
protect the homeowner against abuses and fraudulent practices by licensing
persons engaged in the home improvement, remodeling and repair business.
65
Everything I observed while gathering data for this study, including my con-
versations with DCA personnel, consumers, and contractors, and my observa-
tions of DCA files, hearings, and decisions, is consistent with a shared under-
standing that the above stated purpose is the sole purpose which should guide
the agency in interpreting and enforcing the licensing law.
Third, because the application requirments are non-selective and easily
complied with, the requirement of a DCA license in order to engage in the
home improvement business in New York City has little anti-competitive ef-
fect. Furthermore, the discretionary authority which exists in the law is exer-
cised not by a board composed of representatives of the "regulated" industry,
as is typically the case with occupational licensing, but by the Commissioner
of Consumer Affairs. Since the "restrictive practices of licensed groups are
usually designed within the groups, rather than imposed on them from the
outside," 66 there is little likelihood that the regulations adopted or procedures
followed by DCA will take an anti-competitive turn. Presently, there is not
detectible anti-competitive bias or effect in the DCA regulations 67 or proce-
dures 68 applicable to those engaged in the home improvement business.
In a leading critique of "the abuse of occupational licensing," Professor
Walter Gellhorn concludes:6
To say that licensing has been abused and overused is not to say that
prophylactic administration should be abandoned. I do not advocate reviving
62. See DCA Gen. Reg. 7, supra note 10.
63. HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINESS LAW OF 1968 § B32-355.0(5).
64. 1976 N.Y. LAwS, ch. 931.
65. HOME IMPROVEMENT BUSINESS LAW OF 1968, supra note 9, at § 832-350.0.
66. Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 20-21.
67. See N.Y. DEPT OF CONSUMER AFFAIRS, HOME IMPROVMENT BUSINESS
AMENDED REGULATIONS, reprinted in The City Record (Aug. 15, 1975).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 1-14.
69. See Gellhorn, supra note 53, at 26-27.
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the doctrine of caveat emptor, nor do I, as a realist, suppose for a minute that
customers and clients who have been ill served can be made whole by lawsuits
against their miscreant servitors. Litigation is too unwieldly to meet the needs
of those who have suffered minor injuries. What are needed are measures that
will provide protection against those demonstrably deficient in capability or
integrity without in the process creating artificial limitations upon career
choices, work opportunities, and stimuli to provide superior service at lesser
cost. Among these protective measures are permissive certification and
mandatory registration. . . . A far more comprehensive regulatory device
[than permissive certification] is the simple registration of anyone who desires
to receive a particular occupational license, with the automatic issuance of the
license upon registration. Engaging in the occupation without a license, or
obtaining it by misrepresentation, would be made a serious offense, in order to
stimulate prompt and accurate registration. An appropriate state agency, not
linked with an occupational group, would be created to receive complaints
against licensees, investigate them, and, if objectionable conduct is found, ini-
tiate proceedings looking toward revocation, suspension, or other appropriate
discipline by a court or a special tribunal.
A plan of this nature would, I believe, end the present abuse of licensure
that serves self interests by constricting occupational freedom. It would recap-
ture the public power now delegated to multiple licensing boards whose mem-
bers are drawn from and owe allegiance to the occupations they supposedly
regulate in the public interest. It would require that licensees be subject to
stern discipline, but only after carefully formulated charges, fair hearings,
and impartial determinations, untainted by suspicion that the determiners'
self-interest has influenced their judgment. It would take away the eligibility
of those whose occupational unworthiness could be demonstrated, but would
not, as so many licensing laws now do, place artificial roadblocks in the path
of work opportunities or squelch career aspirations by treating predictive
opinions as final judgments.
DCA's licensing of home improvement contractors and salesmen is, I sub-
mit, an actual, operating, effective version of the hypothetical mandatory re-
gistration plan which Professor Gellhorn justly praises.
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